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Abstract 
Background and Objectives: This study sought to reconcile two lines of research. 
Previous studies have identified a prevalent and causal role of negative imagery in 
social phobia and public speaking anxiety; others have demonstrated that lateral eye 
movements during visualisation of imagery reduce its vividness, most likely by 
loading the visuospatial sketchpad of working memory. It was hypothesised that 
using eye movements to reduce the intensity of negative imagery associated with 
public speaking may reduce anxiety resulting from imagining a public speaking 
scenario compared to an auditory control task.  
Methods: Forty undergraduate students scoring high in anxiety on the Personal 
Report of Confidence as a Speaker scale took part. A semi-structured interview 
established an image that represented the participant’s public speaking anxiety, 
which was then visualised during an eye movement task or a matched auditory task. 
Reactions to imagining a hypothetical but realistic public speaking scenario were 
measured. 
Results: As hypothesised, representative imagery was established and reduced in 
vividness more effectively by the eye movement task than the auditory task. The 
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public speaking scenario was then visualised less vividly and generated less anxiety 
when imagined after performing the eye movement task than after the auditory task. 
Limitations: Self-report measures and a hypothetical scenario rather than actual 
public speaking were used. Replication is required in larger as well as clinical 
samples. 
Conclusions: Visuospatial working memory tasks may preferentially reduce anxiety 
associated with personal images of feared events, and thus provide cognitive 
resistance which reduces emotional reactions to imagined, and potentially real-life 
future stressful experiences.  
 
Key words: EMDR, imagery, public speaking, social anxiety, eye movements, 
working memory 
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1. Introduction 
Despite controversy, several meta-analyses have substantiated the effectiveness of 
Shapiro's (1989; 2001) Eye Movement Desensitisation and Reprocessing (EMDR) 
therapy (Bisson, 2007; Cloitre, 2009) and experimental, laboratory-based paradigms 
have enabled the isolation and testing of the core eye movement component. Typical 
methodologies involve lateral eye movements during image visualisation, with pre-
test and post-test vividness and emotionality ratings. Using this procedure, studies 
have shown that eye movements reduce the intensity of negative autobiographical 
memory and negative future imagery in normal, sub-clinical and clinical samples 
(e.g. Andrade, Kavanagh and Baddeley, 1997; Kavanagh, Freese, Andrade & May, 
2001; Lilley, Andrade, Turpin, Sabin-Farrell & Holmes, 2009; Engelhard, van den 
Hout, Janssen and van der Beek, 2010; Engelhard, van den Hout, Dek et al., 2011). 
Regarding the underlying mechanism of this effect, the consensus is that eye 
movements depend upon limited working memory resources, leaving fewer 
resources to be allocated to the image visualisation (see Postle, Idzikowski, Della 
Sala, Logie & Baddeley, 2006). This interference combined with the volatile nature of 
memory renders the image subject to reconsolidation as less vivid and consequently 
less emotionally salient (see Nader, 2003; Lee, 2008; and Rudy, 2008). Baddeley 
and Andrade (2000) showed that taxing the visuospatial sketchpad specifically 
provided optimum interference with visual imagery. Thus, theoretical accounts based 
on a working  memory perspective and convergent experimental work suggest that 
visuospatial tasks, such as eye movements, reduce the vividness of imagery as a 
result of limited capacity working memory resources, which then reduces 
emotionality (Andrade et al., 1997; Kemps & Tiggemann, 2007; Lilley et al, 2009). 
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A separate line of research has highlighted the prominence of negative imagery in 
the onset and maintenance of anxiety. Hackmann, Clark and McManus (2000) found 
that all 22 of their socially anxious participants experienced recurrent negative 
imagery based around an event that they felt had caused or worsened their 
condition. In an experimental manipulation, Hirsch, Meynen and Clark (2004) found 
that socially anxious participants and their conversational partners rated their 
interaction more negatively when the participants visualised a negative self-image. 
The authors concluded that negative imagery ‘contaminates’ social interaction.  
This finding was replicated in confident public speakers: rehearsing a negative self-
image led to lower self-report performance ratings and increased anxiety during a 
speech (Hirsch, Mathews, Clark, Williams & Morrison, 2006). Negative imagery 
therefore appears to play a causal role in social performance and anxiety, even in 
confident public speakers, and so may be an important factor in public speaking 
anxiety (PSA). Public speaking is a common requirement in many occupations and 
courses of education, and PSA is a prevalent phenomenon affecting educational 
success, career progression and general self-confidence (Bodie, 2010). Novel 
theory-driven approaches to reduce negative imagery in PSA could therefore inform 
interventions for individuals across the social anxiety continuum.  
The present study seeks to reconcile the two lines of research. Negative imagery is 
an established factor in the onset and maintenance of social anxiety (Hackmann et 
al., 2000), and has been shown to ‘contaminate’ future social interaction and public 
speaking performance (Hirsch et al., 2004; 2006). This implies that reducing the 
intensity of such imagery may in turn reduce levels of social anxiety and reduce the 
‘contamination’ observed by Hirsch and colleagues. Reducing the intensity of 
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negative imagery using the eye movement paradigm is, in itself, an established body 
of literature (for review see Jeffries & Davis, 2013) but thus far primarily applied to 
post-traumatic flashbacks in clinical samples or general negative autobiographical 
memories in analogue studies. The rationale for the present study was, therefore, to 
apply the eye movement technique to the negative imagery common in social 
anxiety (specifically public speaking anxiety), in order to test whether such imagery 
may be reduced and if so, whether such reductions would transfer to future public 
speaking image vividness and associated anxiety. 
 
Although the effect of eye movements on imagery is well established, the 
interpretation that this effect stems from modality-specific interference is more 
contentious. In the studies by Andrade et al (1997), Kemps and Tiggemann (2007) 
and Lilley et al (2009), eye movements were compared with concurrent articulation 
(e.g., counting aloud), which arguably is a less novel, less demanding task. Gunter 
and Bodner (2008) suggested that the critical variable is task load not modality 
congruency, reporting that an auditory shadowing task that imposed a similar 
cognitive load to eye movements had similar effects on vividness and emotionality. 
Van den Hout et al (2011) reported that equally demanding tasks, namely, eye 
movements and an attentional breathing task, had similar effects on vividness and 
emotionality despite different visuospatial demands. However, Engelhard, van Uijen 
and van den Hout (2011) found similar effects of two visuospatial tasks, Tetris and 
eye movements, despite differing general loads. In all of these studies, the 
interference tasks differed considerably in features such as task structure and 
response mode as well as in general and modality-specific cognitive load, making it 
hard to evaluate the differing findings. Therefore, a further innovation in the present 
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study was to compare eye movement and auditory tasks that were far more closely 
matched than those used previously. If eye movements are found to reduce public 
speaking anxiety relative to the control task, the effect would be attributable to 
modality-congruent interference rather than general distraction. 
In summary, this study was the first to the authors’ knowledge to apply the 
established eye movement paradigm to the negative imagery in social / public 
speaking anxiety and to observe effects on a hypothetical real-life scenario. The 
study aimed to contribute to the broader and topical body of research in experimental 
psychopathology investigating the nature of working memory interference during 
image visualisation by comparing two closely matched interference tasks differing 
only in relative impact upon visuospatial and auditory working memory. Our 
predictions were as follows: 
1) Participants would be able to report visual mental images representing their       
PSA  
2) The vividness of these representative images would be reduced to a greater 
extent following the eye movement task than the auditory task due to modality-
specific interference  
3) Participants in the eye movement condition would report lower levels of 
emotionality of their images related to social anxiety, and experience less vivid 
imagery of a future public speaking scenario, as well as less associated 
anxiety, than those in the auditory condition. 
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2. Method 
 
2.1 Participants 
Forty Plymouth University undergraduate students participated in the study (mean 
age 22 years, age range = 18-39, 31 females). All participants were screened for 
public speaking anxiety (PSA) using the 12-item Personal Report of Confidence as a 
Speaker (PRCS) scale (Hook, Smith and Valentiner, 2008). Seven participants 
(17%) indicated that they had received treatment for anxiety or related disorders, and 
two participants (5%) declined to respond to this question.  
 
2.2 Measures and Materials 
Personal Report of Confidence as Speaker (PRCS; Hook et al., 2008):  This 12-item 
scale was used as a screening measure, with a six-point rating scale (completely 
disagree to completely agree) as per Martinez-Pecino and Durán (2013) to allow 
increased depth of responding. The PRCS includes items such as ‘While preparing a 
speech I am in a constant state of anxiety’ and ‘I am fearful and tense all the while I 
am speaking before a group of people’. As reported by Hook et al (2008), the scale 
has high internal consistency (Cronbach’s α = .85), and high convergent validity with 
the Social Phobia Scale,( r=.54, p < .001), and the State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait 
scale (r=.44, p < .001).  For post-test re-administration, the short-form PRCS scale 
was amended to the future tense and words such as “speech” substituted with 
“presentation” to reflect the public speaking scenario used here.  
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Image Representativeness, Vividness, Emotionality, Confidence, Anxiety, Task 
Difficulty and Scenario Vividness:  100mm visual analogue scales (VAS) were used 
to record responses whereby 0 = ‘Not at all’ and 100 = ‘Extremely’.  
 
Semi-structured Public Speaking Anxiety Interview (adapted from Hackman et al., 
2000): Experiences of public speaking and associated feelings and imagery were 
elicited by the interviewer. Participants were asked to describe their past 
experiences of public speaking including any negative experiences, how they feel 
during public speaking and what particular aspects of public speaking they believed 
to be anxiety inducing. Participants were asked whether they had experienced any 
imagery during the interview and if so, asked to describe this. In the absence of 
being able to spontaneously report a clear image, participants were probed on 
particular memories or experiences they had mentioned. For example, if the 
participant described dislike of seeing their audience, they would be asked to 
describe how the audience might appear to them. When the interviewer was satisfied 
that a clear visual image had been established, participants rated how well they felt 
that the image represented their PSA on a 100mm VAS. This was used to ensure 
the validity of the image as a visual representation of the participant’s anxiety prior to 
undertaking the main experimental manipulation.  A subset of the interviews were 
transcribed and analysed with the aim of replicating the procedure and findings of 
Hackmann et al. (2000) in the current sub-clinical participant sample using a 
comparable number of participants as originally reported. Themes were identified by 
the experimenter through thematic analysis of the transcripts (Braun and Clarke, 
2006) based on the findings by Hackmann et al. (2000). 
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Concurrent Working Memory Tasks: Visuospatial and auditory interference was 
established using computerized working memory tasks based on Andrade, 
Kavanagh and Baddeley (1997) and Boomsa (2013).  In the visuospatial (eye 
movement) condition, individual letters (5mm height, bold font) were repeatedly 
presented at alternate sides of the computer monitor, on a background of alternating 
black and white stripes (1.5cm in width) in order to increase visuospatial 
interference.  At the beginning of each trial, participants were presented the target 
letter and told to respond when it appeared on either side of the screen by pressing 
the space bar.  Letters were presented in sequences of 20 items. Two sequences 
made up one trial, and the task consisted of 3 trials lasting a total of 60sec. Trial 1 
consisted of 38 presentations of the letter p with the target letter, q, presented once 
at random points in each sequence (a total of twice per trial). This procedure was 
repeated for trial 2 with the target letter d, and trial 3 utilized the letter m with n as the 
target letter. The letters were presented for 300msec with a 200msec interstimulus 
interval.  Participants were asked to refrain from moving their head during the task, 
thus moving only their eyes to focus on each letter. Before the main task, 
participants completed a practice task comprising one sequence of six letters with 
one target. 
 
The comparable auditory condition required participants to listen to spoken letters 
presented in stereo through headphones in front of a blank computer screen. 
Participants responded to target letters placed randomly within a sequence by 
pressing the space bar. Each spoken letter was presented for 400msec with a 
200msec interstimulus interval. The auditory task consisted of sequences of 17 
letters with 1 target per sequence, thus matching the visuospatial task in duration. 
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Again, 2 sequences constituted 1 trial and the task comprised of 3 trials, lasting 
61.2sec. The letter used in trial 1 was P with the target B, P in trial 2 with the target 
D, and M in trial 3 with the target N. As with the visuospatial task, participants 
completed a practice task comprising one sequence of six letters with one target.  
 
The tasks were designed such that they differed only in the working memory 
modality they targeted (i.e., visuospatial working memory or the phonological loop). 
Feedback on performance was not provided to participants. A pilot study confirmed 
that the tasks were of equal cognitive load. Each task was completed by 12 
participants using a counterbalanced within subjects design. No statistically 
significant differences were found between the tasks for self-reported difficulty (M eye 
movements = 5.58, SD = 1.93; M auditory = 5.08, SD = 2.71; t(11)=1.39, p=.191), self-
reported pleasantness (M eye movements = 4.92, SD=1.78; M auditory =4.50, SD=1.73; 
t(11)=.57, p=.581), or task accuracy assessed by the number of correct responses 
(M eye movements = 5.67, SD = 0.65; M auditory = 5.83, SD = 0.39; t(11)=-.692, p=.504.)  
 
Public Speaking Scenario: Participants were given a hypothetical public speaking 
scenario as follows: ‘During a session this week, your personal tutor announced that 
you must deliver a 10 minute PowerPoint presentation to around 15 of your peers. 
You have one week to prepare the presentation, which can be on any topic within 
your core psychology modules. Please spend 20 seconds vividly imagining this 
scenario, as if it were real’. The scenario was piloted in seven Plymouth University 
students.  All participants reported that the scenario was believable and realistic; that 
the audience size, presentation length and preparation time specified in the scenario 
were appropriate and anxiety-inducing. The participants were invited to make 
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additional suggestions, and the scenario was amended slightly based on their 
feedback. 
 
2.3 Procedure  
The study began with the semi-structured interview to explore participant’s 
experience of negative imagery in relation to public speaking. Participants were then 
asked to visualise their representative image of public speaking for 20sec and rate 
the vividness and emotionality on 100mm VASs. They also rated general (trait) 
confidence in and anxiety of public speaking, also on 100mm VASs.  
 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions: visuospatial 
interference (eye movements) and auditory interference, and so completed one of 
the two computer-based tasks as previously described. Participants were asked to 
visualise their image as vividly as possible throughout the task. Immediately 
afterwards, they rated the difficulty of the task and the degree of vividness to which 
they maintained their image on 100mm VASs. Accuracy on the visual and auditory 
tasks was recorded by the software. Participants then completed a final image 
visualisation (20sec), followed by vividness and emotionality ratings.  
 
Participants were then asked to read the public speaking scenario and to spend 
20sec visualising it as vividly as possible. They then rated the vividness of their 
scenario visualisation on a 100mm VAS. Finally, they completed the post-test PRCS 
scale and rated their (state) confidence and anxiety in response to the scenario, 
again on 100mm VASs.  
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3. Results 
 
3.1 Imagery 
The first twenty interviews (mean age 21 years, age range = 18-35; 17 females) 
were transcribed and analysed.  
 
3.1.1 Image Themes 
1) Being the Centre of Attention (8 images, 40%) 
Example 1: Image of the audience “staring” and “looking like they’re waiting.” 
Example 2: “All eyes on me”. 
2) Looking Anxious (4 images, 20%) 
Example: Being “red faced and shaking”. 
3) Making a Mistake (3 images, 15%) 
Example: Watching oneself “muddling papers” and being unable to speak. 
4) Being Judged by the Audience (3 images, 15%) 
Example: Image of the audience “giggling” and “pulling faces” at each other. 
5) The Moments Before Public Speaking (2 images, 10%) 
Example 1: Looking down at a podium, about to begin a presentation.  
Example 2: Facing a backstage door, waiting to enter the stage to begin a speech. 
 
3.2 Image Representativeness 
37 participants (92.5%) agreed that their image was representative of their PSA 
(mean rating = 84.72, SD = 6.50, range = 71-95). Phrases used included “typical of 
public speaking for me”, and “I can fully imagine”.  
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3.3 Working Memory Taxation 
As per Engelhard, van den Hout, Dek, et al. (2011), four participants who were 
unable to generate a vivid image (baseline vividness score < 45 /100) were 
excluded, leaving n = 36 (n = 17 eye-movements, n = 19 auditory). Data were 
checked for outliers and distribution with no causes for concern identified. 
 
3.3.1 Baseline Measures 
Independent samples t tests confirmed that there were no differences in baseline 
(trait) PRCS scores, t(34) = 1.42, p = .166; confidence scores, t(34) = 0.15, p = .882, 
or anxiety scores, t(34) = -.22, p = .828, between groups. Means and SDs are shown 
in Table 1. 
 
3.3.2 Control Measures 
Independent samples t-tests confirmed that there were no differences in image 
representativeness scores, t(20.21) = -1.50, p = .149; task difficulty scores, t(34) = -
.94, p = .352; or task accuracy scores, t(34) = -.83, p = .414, between groups. Means 
and SDs are shown in Table 1. 
 
Table 1 
Mean scores between conditions on baseline and control measures, SDs shown in 
brackets. 
Condition Baseline 
PRCS 
Baseline 
Confidence 
Baseline 
Anxiety 
Image 
Rep. 
Task 
Difficulty 
Task 
Accuracy 
Eye 
Movements 
(n = 17) 
40.18 
(8.54) 
37.62 
(19.83) 
77.47 
(13.18) 
79.88 
(14.76) 
36.79 
(23.22) 
5.47 
(.80) 
Auditory 
(n=19) 
36.21 
(8.27) 
36.47 
(25.40) 
78.53 
(15.41) 
85.61 
(5.69) 
44.12 
(23.16) 
5.68 
(.75) 
Rep = Representativeness 
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3.3.3 Vividness  
A 3 x 2 mixed ANOVA assessed changes in vividness over time within subjects 
(baseline, during the task and after a final visualisation) and between the two task 
conditions (eye movements and auditory). Using the Greenhouse-Geisser correction, 
the ANOVA revealed significant main effects for time, F(1.70, 57.75) = 81.75, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .706, and condition, F(1,34) = 5.68, p = .023, ηp2 = .143, though the 
condition x time interaction showed only a trend in the expected direction, 
F(1.70,57.75) = 3.00, p = .066, ηp2 = .081. Paired samples t tests to investigate this 
trend revealed significant drops in vividness during the task (from baseline) for both 
conditions, t(16) = 10.34, p < .001, d = 2.51, (eye movements), t(18) = 8.10, p < 
.001, d = 1.86, (auditory), and significant increases from the task to the post-test 
visualisation t(16) = -5.50, p < .001, d = -1.33 (eye movements), t(18) = -6.58, p < 
.001, d = -1.51 (auditory). Independent samples t tests confirmed that there were no 
significant differences in baseline vividness scores between conditions, t(34) = -.326, 
p = .746, but that the eye movements vividness scores were significantly lower than 
auditory vividness scores during the task, t(34) = -2.67, p = .012, d = 0.90 and 
marginally lower after the post-test visualisation, t(34) =  -1.96, p = .058, d = 0.64.  
Crucially, paired samples t tests also showed that images in the auditory condition 
reverted back to their original (baseline) vividness during the final post-test 
visualisation, t(18) = .326, p = .748, whereas post-test visualisation vividness scores 
in the eye movements condition were significantly lower than baseline vividness 
scores, t(16) = 2.17, p =.045, d = 0.53. Means and SDs can be seen in Table 2.  
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Figure 1: Baseline image vividness, image vividness during the concurrent working 
memory task and post-test image vividness between conditions (Mean +/- SD) 
 
3.3.4 Emotionality 
Emotionality scores were compared at baseline to the post-test image visualisation 
between groups. A 2x2 mixed ANOVA did not reveal significant main effects for time, 
F(1, 34) = 2.34, p = .135, nor condition, F(1, 34) = .099, p = .756. The condition x 
time interaction was in the expected direction, F(1, 34) =  2.83, p = .102, but did not 
reach significance. Means and SDs can be seen in Table 2.  
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Table 2 
Mean vividness and emotionality scores between conditions across time, SDs shown 
in brackets. 
Condition Baseline 
Vividness 
Task 
Vividness 
Post-test 
Vividness 
Baseline 
Emotionality 
Post-test 
Emotionality 
Eye 
movements 
(n=17) 
77.85 
(10.74) 
36.82 
(13.24) 
68.12 
(19.98) 
65.56 
(21.80) 
53.88 
(20.74) 
Auditory 
(n=19) 
79.13 
(12.58) 
51.97 
(19.75) 
78.29 
(10.03) 
61.55 
(25.13) 
62.11 
(23.27) 
 
 
3.3.5 Scenario Vividness 
An independent samples t test confirmed that scenario vividness scores were 
significantly lower in the eye movements condition (M = 67.71, SD = 13.28), than the 
auditory condition (M = 81.05, SD = 14.27), t(34) = -2.89, p = .007, d = 0.97, even 
though participants stopped doing the eye movements or auditory task prior to 
visualising the scenario. 
 
3.3.6 Post-test Measures 
Independent measures t tests showed no significant differences between conditions, 
for post-test (state) PRCS scores(M eye movements = 40.12, SD = 8.85; M auditory = 40.00, 
SD = 7.53), t(34) = .04, p = .966, or post-test (state) confidence scores (M eye movements 
= 38.94, SD = 21.90; M auditory = 37.47, SD = 24.42), t(34) = .19, p = .851. However, 
post-test (state) anxiety scores for the eye movements group (M = 73.74, SD = 
14.53) were significantly lower than for the auditory group (M = 82.53, SD = 11.25), 
t(34)=-2.04, p=.049, d = 0.68.  
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4. Discussion 
As hypothesised, it was possible to establish a vivid visual image representative of 
public speaking anxiety (PSA) for the large majority of participants. The vividness of 
these images dropped significantly during both concurrent tasks, suggesting that 
concurrent cognitive load, regardless of the specific locus of working memory 
interference (see Gunter and Bodner, 2008), may have at least temporary benefits.  
However, our data suggest that larger and longer lasting benefits were found in the 
eye movement condition. While vividness levels returned to baseline in the auditory 
condition after the task, they remained lower than baseline in the eye movement 
condition, consistent with previous demonstrations that effects are durable (van den 
Hout, Muris, Salemink & Kindt, 2001). We suggest that these findings are in 
accordance with Baddeley & Andrade (2000), who found that visuospatial 
interference reduced visual image vividness more effectively than auditory 
interference. In the current study, the auditory and visuospatial tasks were closely 
matched and previous small-scale pilot work indicated the tasks were of comparable 
load. Although this initial pilot work may not have been well-powered, both tasks 
required detection of infrequent targets from similar distractors and used the same 
timings and response modes, with the critical difference being that the visual task 
required eye movements to spot targets and the auditory task required careful 
listening. In the current study, participants in both conditions performed equally well 
on the tasks and gave them equivalent difficulty ratings suggesting matching had 
been successful.  
 
The trend towards greater vividness reductions in the eye movement condition, 
along with the clear differences between conditions in scenario visualisation and 
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concomitant anxiety, suggests that eye movements may have a greater impact on 
visual imagery compared to auditory interference, due in part to modality congruency 
(Andrade et al, 1997; Engelhard et al, 2011; Kemps & Tiggemann, 2007; Lilley et al, 
2009) and not solely to differences in general task load (Gunter & Bodner, 2008; van 
den Hout et al, 2011).  However the difference in vividness reductions between 
conditions was significant only at trend level and the larger drop in emotionality for 
the eye movements group compared to the auditory group did not reach statistical 
significance.  
 
Significant reductions in both the vividness of the hypothetical scenario as well as 
reduced state anxiety were observed in the eye movements group compared to the 
auditory group. Notably, there were no differences in the scenario-based PRCS 
scores or confidence scores between groups, and the magnitude of effect for eye 
movements appeared greater for the scenario vividness ratings than for the 
representative image post-task. The extent of potential transfer of the reduction of 
vividness of past negative imagery to a reduction in image vividness and anxiety for 
future public speaking requires replication and extension, as well exploration of the 
potential underlying mechanisms.  
 
We postulate that negative self-imagery would ordinarily be incorporated into (or 
would ‘contaminate’; Hirsch et al., 2004) the scenario visualisation, adding to its 
vividness, negativity and resultant anxiety. Reducing the vividness of this self-
imagery with competing visuospatial working memory load reduced its power to 
contaminate. This cognitive resistance to contamination meant that the scenario was 
not visualised as vividly and negatively as it may otherwise have been, manifesting 
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in a reduced anxiety response. Our interpretation is, however, preliminary as the 
study did not include a control scenario condition to confirm that the effects were 
specific to public speaking imagery. It is therefore possible that the eye movements 
group would have visualised any further imagery less vividly than the control group 
which would mean that the reduced scenario vividness was due to another effect, 
such as visuospatial working memory fatigue, rather than reduced contamination. 
The tasks were short, relatively undemanding and matched for difficulty which 
renders working memory fatigue or ego depletion less likely (see Baumeister, 
Bratslavsky, Muraven & Tice, 1998), but future research should seek to confirm this. 
Crucially, a reduced anxiety response was observed in the eye movement group 
regardless of the underlying mechanism. 
 
The study used a hypothetical scenario and would benefit from replication using a 
real-life public speaking challenge. An additional limitation of the study is its reliance 
on self-report measures; future research could use psychophysiological measures as 
an objective measure of anxiety. Replications of the methodology should include a 
control scenario as previously described, and larger as well as clinical samples.   
 
 As well as anxiety, effects of reducing the vividness of negative imagery in social 
anxiety could be examined in terms of other relevant constructs such as implicit and 
explicit self-esteem. Any generalisation of the effect to public speaking or clinical 
samples is as yet speculative, pending replication, but the findings hold promise that 
cognitive manipulations that reduce the vividness of negative images before a social 
performance will help reduce anxiety during the performance. This would aid those 
experiencing anxiety prior to public speaking and, potentially, individuals for whom 
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negative self-imagery ‘contaminates’ their social interactions. Replication of the study 
in socially anxious individuals meeting diagnostic criteria and investigation of their 
performance in an actual social situation following the manipulation would be an 
interesting next step with more compelling clinical implications. Though preliminary, 
the study exemplifies a novel application of the eye movement technique beyond 
application to PTSD. Indeed,  the methodology reported here may be used to 
investigate the effects of eye movements on other forms of negative imagery such as 
those found in phobias and health anxiety (see Hirsch & Holmes, 2007), suicidal 
imagery in depression (see Holmes, Crane, Fennell & Williams, 2007), and recurrent 
visual imagery accompanying cravings (e.g. Tiggemann & Kemps, 2005). Image 
themes relating to public speaking anxiety were a supplement to the quantitative 
methodology described here, but could be more deeply explored in qualitative work.  
 
4.1 Conclusion                                                                                                                     
Public speaking anxiety can typically be represented in a visual mental image. These 
anxiety-images contaminate anticipations of public speaking performance but may 
be made less vivid through visuospatial interference. Reducing the vividness of 
representative images may reduce the imagined vividness of future feared events as 
well as subsequent anxiety. This cognitive resistance to contamination demonstrates 
a preliminary but promising novel finding within a well-established paradigm, and 
eagerly awaits replication and further exploration. 
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